Perspectives, Questions, and Epistemic Value

Many epistemologists endorse true-belief monism, the thesis that only true beliefs are of fundamental epistemic value. However, this view faces formidable counterexamples. In response to these challenges, we alter the letter, but not the spirit, of true-belief monism. We dub the resulting view “inquisitive truth monism”, which holds that only true answers to relevant questions are of fundamental epistemic value. Which questions are relevant is a function of an inquirer’s perspective, which is characterized by his/her interests, social role, and background assumptions. Using examples of several different scientific practices, we argue that inquisitive truth monism outperforms true-belief monism

Inquiring Attitudes and Erotetic Logic: Norms of Restriction and Expansion

A fascinating recent turn in epistemology focuses on inquiring attitudes like wondering and being curious. Many have argued that these attitudes are governed by norms similar to those that govern our doxastic attitudes. Yet, to date, this work has only considered norms that might *prohibit* having certain inquiring attitudes (``norms of restriction''), while ignoring those that might *require* having them (``norms of expansion''). We aim to address that omission by offering a framework that generates norms of expansion for inquiring attitudes. The framework draws on inferential erotetic logic, which we explain and augment with some theorems. We explore several of the norms that it yields - some sympathetically, others unsympathetically

Queries and Assertions in Minimally Discursive Practices

Robert Brandom’s normative-pragmatic theory is intended to represent the minimal set of practical abilities whose exhibition qualifies creatures as speaking a language. His model of a minimally discursive practice (MDP) is one in which participants, devoid of logical vocabulary, are only capable of making assertions and drawing inferences. This paper argues that Brandom’s purely assertional practices are not MDPs and that speech acts of asking questions (queries) must be included in any practice that counts as an MDP. The upshot of the argument is support for the claim that the normative pragmatic analysis of assertions requires a corresponding analysis of queries and vice versa

Recent Contributions to Dilthey's Philosophy of the Human Sciences

In explicating his theory of world-views, Dilthey argues for a Philosophie der Philosophie that accepts no claim in isolation and no striving in its immediacy. This means that all theoretical and practical positions must be justified and related to a reflective context that allows no special discipline a final say. Disciplinary boundaries can always be questioned for the sake of a more encompassing perspective. But world-views are effective only if they bring the conceptualizing and generalizing tendencies of philosophy in relation to the concrete needs of life that find their expression in religious and cultural practices and in the arts and literature. Accordingly, Dilthey conceived his program of a Critique of Historical Reason as the search for the life conditions that make possible the understanding of intellectual and socio-cultural developments on the basis of the situatedness of the human beings that first produced and experienced them. The Dilthey International Yearbook (DIY) presents itself as a platform for Diltheyforschung, but beyond that it shall serve as a forum for all researchers that are engaged in renewing the methods of intellectual history, of the history of philosophy, and of the history of concepts. It will gather researchers of different traditions and cultures under one roof. Contributions will be published in English, French, Spanish, German, Portuguese, and Italian, preceded by abstracts in the original language and in English. Dilthey\u2019s approach to history is important because it relates the disciplinary search of the human sciences for valid cognition (Erkenntnis) to a more overarching quest for reflective knowledge (Wissen). Self-reflection frames the human sciences and provides insights into how knowledge arises from the interaction between individuals and society. When studying culture, the human sciences engage not just with its present manifestations, but also with those of the past. All culture comes to us from the past. The social expressions of conceptual systems are rooted in language and history, while the transmission and transformation of cognitive systems is the object of study of pedagogical and educational research and of the history and philosophy of sciences. We are looking, then, at diverse traditions of the humanities. The list of humanistic disciplines is hardly a static one. Delimitations as to what constitutes the humanities vary from country to country, from research council to research council, from university to university. In the future, academic life may well be defined as multi-cultural and post-disciplinary. Trans- and interdisciplinarity and horizontal integration are increasingly on the agenda. Humanistic research is about to redraw its boundaries while responding to external social and political demands as well as to internal developments and methodological advances